IDENTITY POLITICS OF ISLAMIC MAJORITY AND NON-ISLAMIC MINORITY VOTERS IN PRACTICAL POLITICS IN INDONESIA: ANALYSIS OF THE 2019 AND 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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Abstract: *In the 2019 and 2024 presidential elections, identity politics influenced Muslim majority voters and non-Muslim minorities. In 2019, the Prabowo-Sandi pair was linked to Islamic identity politics, while in 2024, the Anise-Muhaimin pair was still considered to carry the Islamic religious identity. Several studies have identified psychological asymmetry between the majority and minority, highlighting the influence of group identity on emotional responses and voter behavior and finding psychological pressure that makes voters believe in their extreme views. In Indonesia, religious identity politics, especially Islam, plays a significant role in shaping political choices. The LSI survey (2018) showed that more than 50% of voters choose leaders based on religion. Several other studies have also confirmed that religious sentiment influences voting behavior. Although there has been no specific study on the differences in support for Islamic politics in Muslim majority and minority provinces, the dynamics of Indonesian politics show that religious identity is still a powerful tool for mobilizing voters. This study explores the role of identity politics in influencing the political participation of the Muslim majority and non-Muslim minorities. The focus is on how group identity is used to mobilize political support and its impact on election outcomes. The hypothesis states that the Muslim majority tends to support candidates with an Islamic political identity, while minorities avoid such candidates. The research method includes qualitative and quantitative data, with sources from online news, surveys, exit polls, and KPU data. We also administered questionnaires to 85 students from the State Islamic University and conducted 6 in-depth online interviews. The findings show that Muslim voters are less likely to use identity politics in the 2024 presidential election compared to 2019, while non-Muslim voters continue to avoid candidates who support Islamic identity politics. This suggests that Islamic political identity is dynamic, with Muslim-majority voters being more flexible in their political choices. This study provides insight into the role of religious identity in Indonesian politics and its relevance to building a more inclusive and democratic Islamic society. The findings can help identify strategies for empowering Islamic communities in dealing with practical politics in Indonesia.*

Keywords: majority-minority, Islamic and non-Islamic voters, identity politics, 2019 and 2024 presidential elections

I. INTRODUCTION

Ahead of the Presidential Election and Regional Head Election, candidate pairs often use identity politics strategies to attract voters based on identities such as religion and ethnicity. In the 2019 Presidential Election, the Prabowo Sandi pair and in the 2024 Presidential Election, the Anise Muhaimin pair were each considered to be prioritizing identity politics. The use of identity politics can be effective in gaining support from certain groups, but it can also trigger polarization and strengthen identity sentiment in society. The phenomenon of identity politics in Indonesia is very interesting and complex, especially considering the context of its predominantly Muslim population that appears to be "hostile" to each other. Surveys such as those conducted by the Denny JA Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) show that identity politics, especially those based on religion, remain a very significant factor in determining voter choices in Indonesia. With around 90% of the voting population being Muslim, Muslim voters are a group that is highly regarded and has a high political "selling value." In the majority Muslim group, this division is not only seen among religious leaders but also spreads to the wider community. Meanwhile, non-Islamic groups, as minorities, may feel the need to strengthen themselves and their groups in the face of increasingly heated political dynamics. In this context, minority groups often become more solid in their communities, build stronger networks, and sometimes even take advantage of the situation to gain political support or better protection. The declaration of Anise Baseman as a presidential candidate by the Nas Dem Party on October 3, 2022, sparked a more intense discussion about identity politics in Indonesia. Following the declaration, a survey by

Saiful Mujina Research and Consulting (SMRC) released on October 6, 2022, showed a shift in the pattern of support based on the religious identity of voters. Support from non-Muslim voters for the Nas Dem Party experienced a significant decline, from 6.8% before Anise' declaration to only 2.5% afterwards. In contrast, support from Muslim voters for the Nas Dem Party remained relatively stable, only increasing slightly from 3.3% to 3.7%. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, identity politics aims to "secure the political freedom of certain constituencies that are marginalized within a larger context." The Guardian also highlights how identity politics develops when groups feel threatened or marginalized. According to Tajfel and Turner's theory, an individual's social identity is formed based on their relationship with a particular social group. Individuals tend to identify themselves with a social group (ingroup) to protect and support their self-identity. This process is called social identity theory. This theory explains that humans naturally carry out social categorization, where they group themselves into certain groups that they consider to be "ingroups" and distinguish themselves from "outgroups." [23] argues that intergroup conflict occurs when two groups compete for limited resources. According to Brewer and Pierce, social identity complexity refers to the way individuals subjectively represent the relationships between their various memberships in social groups. Minority groups can play an important role in driving change by introducing alternative views and influencing the majority through their consistency, determination, and firmness of attitude [24]. From the data on the number of Islamic Party votes in the 2019 and 2021 elections, the number of Muslim voters amounted to 87%; there were 56.31% and 56.11% of Muslim voters who did not

vote for the Islamic Party. This means that there are around 44% of Muslim voters who did not vote for Islamic parties. Did religious identity politics occur in 2019 and 2024? even though in all elections during the Reformation era, the number of Islamic Party voters was relatively the same as in the 2019 and 2024 Elections. even though Islam and Islamic voters are the majority? Does religious identity politics still influence Muslim and non-Muslim voters? Quoting Crano (2001 in Crano & Seyranian, 2007) [3], the majority can be considered as the right source of information on critical issues. Gardikiotis (2011) stated that minorities can have an influence [3], The Muslim community also feels like a minority and experiences discrimination. Muslims, for example, face discrimination in education and employment (Brown 2000; Modood *et al.* 1997; and White 2002) [3]. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) [4] concluded that the quantity of intergroup contact has a positive effect on prejudice. Furthermore, the positive effect of contact on prejudice appears to be greater than the effect of prejudice on contact. McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, and Nolle (1995) [5] found that tolerance levels were higher among people living in more ethnically heterogeneous communities. Bond (2004) [6] explains that several indications show that there is higher conformity in minority communities than conformity in majority communities. Jenkins (2008) [7], says identity shows how individuals and collectivities are differentiated to other individuals and collectivities.According to Simon and Klandermans (2001)[8], an important part of politicization is acquiring a politicized (i.e., activist) identity. Adorno, et al (1950) argues that a person's personality type predisposes him or her to certain types of political identities and behaviors. Quoting Druckman (1994) [9], the existing social psychology literature can contribute in important ways to our understanding of the basis of national loyalty and its relationship to intergroup conflict. Prooijen and Krouwel (2019), specifically examine the relationship between political extremism and (a) psychological distress, (b) cognitive simplicity, (c) overconfidence, and (d) intolerance. The results show that these four psychological traits can trigger political extremism. This insight is important for understanding how political polarization increases political instability and the likelihood of intergroup conflict in society [10]. Islam places politics as a way of safeguarding the affairs of the people (ri'ayah syu-un al-ummah). Islam and politics cannot be separated. Likewise, politics without Islam will only give birth to a society that glorifies power, position, material things and the worldly, empty of moral and spiritual aspects [11]. Shepard (1987) [12] explains that 'Islamic totalism' is the tendency to view Islam not only as a religion in the narrow sense, which includes theological beliefs, personal prayer, and worship rituals but as a total outlook on life. In the political aspect, it should be noted that during the time of the Prophet Muhammad SAW, the social and political order of Islam was established in Medina. According to al-Mawardi, the concept of Islamic politics is based on the obligation to establish an institution of power because the institution of power was built as a substitute for prophecy to protect religion and regulate the world [13]. Al-Ghazali agrees with al-Mawardi that establishing an imamate is

obligatory [14]. According to Azra, there are two major views on the relationship between Islam and politics. First, seeing politics as an integral part of religion. Second, the opinion that politics is indeed part of religion (Islam), but between the two there are very essential differences in character [15]. Munawir Sadzalli said that in the Qur'an there are a number of verses that contain instructions and guidelines for humans in living in society and the state [16]. Political Islam or Islamism is broadly defined as 'a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations pursuing political goals' and 'providing a political response to the challenges of today's society by imagining a future, the foundations of which rest on adapted and reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition' [17]. Quoting [18], Islamism has been largely operationalized as a single-factor phenomenon using a variety of proxy measures in empirical research; including measures based on support for the Islamic Caliphate, individuals' judgments that non-religious politicians are unfit for public office, or a desire for Sharia-based law and public officials with strong religious beliefs'. Furthermore, Most empirical studies on Political Islam rely on observations drawn from a single region, and/or one or a few case countries, and have made broad generalizations about how Muslims view the role of Islam in politics. [19] and [20] argue hat although most comparative political literature juxtaposes support for Islamism into two broad categories - moderate vs. radical - confusion between the two concepts persists. [21] and [22] said there is no need to question or differentiate between moderate and radical, but some experts such as Kurzman (1998), March (2015) and Volpi and Stein (2015) still emphasize the need to distinguish between different political views among devout Muslims. However, scholars agree that the validity of various conceptual claims about Political Islam must be tested by the weight of empirical evidence [25]. Nasr's view (2005) provides important insights into the relationship between Islam and democracy and the role of religiosity in supporting democratic political systems in Muslim countries. Nasr argues that the future of democracy in Muslim countries will not depend on an abstract theological or ideological accommodation between Islam and democracy. Rather, Muslim democracies will develop through a practical synthesis that emerges from direct interaction with the opportunities and demands faced through the electoral process. This adaptation and synthesis will be driven more by practical needs and responses to the existing political and social context, rather than by isolated ideological or theological theories. [18] argues that moderation in political Islam emphasizes Islam's ability to adapt to modern principles such as civil liberties, human rights, and social justice. Gellner (1983) in his book "Nations and Nationalism" highlights how religion can be a major force in shaping national identity. Taylor (in Arthur, 2021) wrote "The Politics of Recognition", highlighting the importance of recognizing group identities in a multicultural democracy. Several studies have tried to examine politics and Islam in relation to identity politics. Research Pepinsky, *et al*. (2012), on Testing the Superiority of Islamic Politics: Evidence from Indonesia; research (2021) on Identity Politics and the Future of

Democracy in Papua; research Istiqomah, et al. (2022) on Islam and Politics: Analysis of the Latent Class of Indonesian Islam Based on Political Attitudes and Determinants; Salim's research (2022) on Islamic political support and voting behavior in Muslim majority and minority provinces in Indonesia; research Kristimanta and Mouliza (2018) on the Politicization of Identity in Regional Elections as a Security Threat: The Case of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election; ResearchSuherman, Putra, and Mansur (2019) on the Contestation of identity politics in public space: A steep road of democracy in Indonesia; and researchSetiawan, Esti, and Sidorov (2020) about Islam and Politics in Indonesia, be the reference material for this research. This research is about the identity politics of the Islamic community in Indonesia, especially in the 2019 and 2024 presidential elections. The research tries to identify how majority and minority groups (Muslim and non-Muslim voters) play a role in identity politics and use their identities to influence choices in the 2019 and 2024 presidential elections.

II. METHOD

Researchers use a mixed type of research in the form of quantitative and qualitative research. The use of both research methods is expected to provide a more complete understanding of the research problems raised. Qualitative research is descriptive to narrate quantitative data derived from primary and secondary data. Data collection in this study was carried out through questionnaires and in-depth interviews as primary data and through literature studies, analysis of election results and survey reports from research institutions for secondary data. The sample in this study were students of the State Islamic University (UIN). The reason for choosing students is because they are a sample of educated people and are expected to understand the purpose and problems of the study. The sampling technique in this study used a probability sample that allows researchers to generalize findings from the sample to the target population. Generalizations can be made 'only' for the actual population determined by the sampling frame. Students who become respondents must meet the following requirements, namely having participated and actively voted in the 2019 Election, having completed at least semester 6 of their studies, coming from the faculty of da'wah, being active participants in political parties and their undertows, being able and understanding the use of Google forms and being willing to be respondents. Respondents who fill out the questionnaire can also be informants (interview respondents). Willingness and determination as informants are determined by researchers based on the results of filling out the questionnaire. The number of informants is at least 4 people. Interviews with informants are conducted online. The questionnaire is made by researchers with a minimum of 1 consultation with an expert promoter. The questionnaire is delivered in the form of a Google form.

III. RESULTS

The study was conducted in mid-October and November 2023. The number of respondents was 85 people with 24 men (28%) and 61 women (72%). The age of the respondents consisted of 13 people aged 20 years (15%), 50 people aged 21 years (59%), 17 people aged 22 years (20%) and 5 people

aged 23 years (6%). Respondents who had completed semester 7 and above were 62 people (73%) and those who had completed semesters below 7 were 23 people (27%). Respondents who were able to participate in the election and exercise their right to vote (to vote) were 48 people (57%), those who were able to participate in the election but did not exercise their right to vote (did not vote) were 7 people (8%) and those who had not participated in the election were 30 people (35%). Of the 85 respondents, the description of "hearing the word Identity Politics ahead of the 2019 Election" is as follows. There are 50 people (59%) who "heard the word Identity Politics (related to religion)" and there are 35 people (41%) who have never "heard the word Identity Politics (related to religion)". From the description of "understanding the meaning of identity politics discussed during the 2019 Election", there are 27 people (32%) who understand and there are 58 people (68%) who do not understand. From the description of "understand that the Muslim community is the majority group in Indonesia", there were 83 people (98%) who agreed and there were 2 people (2%) who disagreed. Of the 48 respondents who used their voting rights in the 2019 Election, there were 26 (54%) people who voted for the President due to the influence of identity politics (due to closeness in Tribe, or Religion, or Race, or One Group) and there were 22 people (46%) who voted for the President not due to the influence of identity politics (due to closeness in Tribe, or Religion, or Race, or One Group). Furthermore, there were 31 (65%) people who-electing the President based on 'views' and or 'opinions' from the surrounding environment (home or family or friends or school or campus)and there were 17 people (35%) who-electing the President based on 'views' and/or 'opinions' from the surrounding environment (home or family or friends or school or campus). Of the 85 respondents, the description "still hear identity politics (especially religion) being used to gain support ahead of the 2024 Election", there were 54 people (64%) who heard and there were 31 people (36%) who did not hear. From the description of "b," it is okay to use identity politics (especially religion) in practical politics", There are 55 people (65%) agree and there are 30 people (35%) disagree. From the description ""All political parties use identity politics in practical politics", There are 60 people (71%) who agree and there are 25 people (29%) who disagree. From the statement "Islamic-themed parties are an example of identity politics (religion)".There were 69 people (81%) who agreed and 16 people (19%) who disagreed. From the statement." Islam has become a means of identity politics in practical politics." There were 67 people (79%) who agreed and 18 people (21%) who disagreed. From the statement ""Voters may use identity politics to determine their choice in the 2024 General Election, "There were 59 people (69%) agreed and 26 people (31%) disagreed. Furthermore, based on the statement "Muslims (society) need to be given an understanding of Identity Politics and Islamophobia", there are 74 people (87%) who agree and 11 people (13%) who disagree. Based on the statement "Muslims (society) need to be given an understanding of identity politics through certain means or media, the results obtained are that 64 people (87%) through

sermons/studies/religious studies at the mosque and 11 people (13%) through courses at universities. In addition, there are 29 respondents provided suggestions that understanding identity politics be carried out through counselling seminars or socialization supported or facilitated by the government, providing information via the internet or mass media and sharing on YouTube, through Islamic mass organizations directly in their respective regions, developing large projects such as religious moderation projects so that they become the general norm of society and including them in the education curriculum. From 85 respondents who answered the questionnaire, they included their mobile phone numbers as their willingness to be interviewed in depth. In this study, researchers contacted via WhatsApp messages 5 respondents at 2 different UINs regarding their willingness and time availability. All responded to the WhatsApp messages, and then 6 respondents were randomly selected to be informants to answer in-depth questions. The interview was conducted via Zoom Meet which had been previously prepared and sent to the informant's WhatsApp. The interview lasted approximately 30 minutes, recorded by asking for prior consent. Interview with informant 1, a male who works as a lecturer was conducted on October 27, 2023, at 19:48 until finished. Interview with informant 2, a male student, was conducted on October 27, 2023, at 19:30 until finished. Interview with informant 3, a male student, was conducted on November 01, 2023, at 18:30 until finished. Interview with informant 4, a female student, was conducted on November 01, 2023, at 19:30 until finished. Interview with informant 5, a female student, was conducted on November 04, 2023, at 18:40 until finished. Finally, an Interview with informant 6, a male student, was conducted on November 05, 2023 at 19:30 until finished. By using a comparison of the results of the 2019 Presidential Election and the 2024 Presidential Election, it is proven that Muslim majority voters and non-Muslim minority voters use their identities in determining their political choices. The data compared are data from the Presidential Election results in 9 provinces with Muslim majority voters and 5 provinces with non-Muslim majority voters. Although lost in the 2019 presidential election, the Prabowo-Sandi pair was able to win with a relatively large vote in 9 provinces where the majority of voters are Muslim. The Prabowo-Sandi pair lost in 5 provinces where the majority of voters are non-Muslim. This means that the Prabowo-Sandi pair in the presidential election experienced a very significant lack of support from non-Muslim voters, who were more inclined towards Jokowi-Ma'ruf.

ISLAMIC MAJORITY		
PROV	JM	PS
Aceh	14.41%	85.59%
Boast	14.08%	85.92%
Riau	38.73%	61.27%
South Sumatra	40.30%	59.70%
Banten	38, 46%	61.54%

NON-ISLAMIC MAJORITY		
PROV	JM	PS
Bali	91.68%	8.32%
NTT	88.57%	11.43%
North Sulawesi	77.24%	22.76%
Papua	90.66%	9.34%
Pabar	79.81%	20.19%

In the 2024 presidential election, the Anies Muhaimin pair was only able to win with a relatively large number of votes in 2 provinces where the majority of voters are Muslim. In 7 out of 9 provinces where the majority of voters are Muslim, the Anies Muhaimin pair did not receive maximum support. However, the Anies Muhaimin pair was the same as the Prabowo-Sandi pair

who lost in 5 provinces where the majority of voters were non-Muslim. This means that the Prabowo-Sandi pair in the 2019 presidential election and the Anies Muhaimin pair in the 2024 presidential election both experienced crushing defeats in 5 provinces where the majority of voters were non-Muslim.

ISLAMIC MAJORITY			
PROV	AMEN	PRAGIB	GAME
Aceh	73.56 %	24.43 %	2.01 %
Boast	56.54 %	39.47 %	3.99 %
Riau	37.96 %	52.35 %	9.69 %
South Sumatra	18.98 %	69.47 %	11.55 %
Banten	34.02 %	55.99 %	9.99 %

NON-ISLAMIC MAJORITY			
PROV	AMEN	PRAGIB	GAME
Bali	3.70%	54.26 %	42.04 %
NTT	5.27 %	61.80 %	32.93 %
North Sulawesi	7.30 %	75.31 %	17.39 %
Papua	10.81 %	60.62 %	28.56 %
Pabar	11.32 %	52.26 %	36.43 %

By using non-parametric statistical tests (samples below 30) Mann-Whitney U Test in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), there is indeed a significant difference. The difference in votes for the Prabowo Sandi pair in the 2019 Presidential Election and the Anies Muhaimin pair in the 2024 Presidential Election in 9 provinces whose voters are predominantly Muslim is very significant. The results of the Mann-Whitney test show the following.

Test Statistics

	Value
Mann-Whitney U	7,000
Wilcoxon W	52,000
Z	-2.958
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.003
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]	.002b

With a U value of 7, a Z value of -2.958 and an asymptotic significance value (2-tailed) of 0.03 and a significance value of 0.02, it can be concluded that the difference between the two groups is statistically at a significance level of 5% (p <0.05) namely 0.03 <0.05 and 0.02 <0.05. This means that the votes of voters in 9 provinces whose voters are predominantly Muslim are very different in giving their votes to Prabowo Sandi in the 2019 Presidential Election with Anies Muhaimin in the 2024 Presidential Election, both of which carry Islamic identity politics.

On the other hand, there is no significant difference in the vote acquisition of the Prabowo-Sandi pair in the 2019 presidential election and the Anies-Muhaimin pair in the 2024 presidential election in 5 provinces whose voters are predominantly non-Muslim. The results of the Mann-Whitney test show the following.

Test Statistics

	Value
Mann-Whitney U	4,000
Wilcoxon W	19,000
Z	-1,776
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.076
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]	.095b

With a U value of 4, a Z value of -1.776 an asymptotic significance value (2-tailed) of 0.076 and a significance value of 0.095, it can be concluded that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups at the 5% significance level (p <0.05) namely 0.076> 0.05 and 0.95> 0.05. This means that the votes of voters in 5 provinces whose voters are predominantly non-Muslims, do not differ in giving their votes to Prabowo Sandi in the 2019 Presidential Election with Anies Muhaimin in the 2024 Presidential Election, which is very small, because both carry Islamic identity politics.

These differences in results may reflect changes in voter preferences and responses to identity politics in Muslim voters and non-Muslim voters. It can be concluded that voters who are predominantly Muslim do not use references to Islamic identity politics in determining their choice of President in the 2024 Presidential Election. On the other hand, voters who are predominantly non-Muslim continue to use identity politics in determining their choice. This identity politics includes religious identity and ethnic identity.

This study also found that voters from 6 ethnic groups whose voters are predominantly Muslim vary in supporting candidates who promote Islamic identity politics. Voters from the Acehnese and Minang ethnic groups can be concluded to still support candidates who promote Islamic identity politics. The Batak, Javanese, Betawi and Bugis ethnic groups are not affected by identity politics. Especially for the Betawi ethnic group, support for the Anies Muhaimin pair is relatively high, apart from promoting Islamic identity politics, also because they are satisfied with Anies' leadership during his time as Governor of DKI Jakarta.

IV.DISCUSSION

The 2019 presidential election in Indonesia is often considered an election that is heavily influenced by identity politics, especially Islamic identity. The Prabowo Sandi pair in the 2019 presidential election are considered to have adopted Islamic identity politics to gain voter support. The Prabowo-Sandi pair are known to actively use Islamic symbols and rhetoric in their campaign. They often attend religious events, collaborate with Islamic figures, and deliver messages that emphasize the importance of Islamic identity and values. This approach is designed to resonate with more religiously conservative voters, especially in areas with large Muslim populations. In the 2019 presidential election, data shows that the Prabowo-Sandi pair received significant support from voter groups with a strong Islamic identity. This is evident from the high support from areas with large Muslim populations and more religious voters.

In the 2024 presidential election, there is a shift in strategy in political campaigns. For example, there are indications that some candidates are focusing more on policy and economic issues than on religious identity alone. However, identity politics still plays a role, especially in the context of mobilizing certain voter bases. In the 2024 presidential election, the Anies-Muhaimin pair was also identified as a pair that carried Islamic identity politics. The pair Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar are known to have strong backgrounds in the Islamic community. Anies Baswedan was previously known for his close ties to Muhammadiyah, one of the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, while Muhaimin Iskandar is a figure from NU (NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. In the 2024 presidential election campaign, Anies-Muhaimin used Islamic rhetoric and symbols to attract support from voters with religious identities. They attended various religious events and approached religious figures to gain support. This approach seems to be designed to strengthen support from Muslim voter groups, especially those with strong affiliations with NU or Muhammadiyah. This could affect support patterns in areas with large Muslim populations. Compared to the other 2 pairs, namely Prabowo-Gibran and Ganjar-Mahfud, it seems that the Ganjar-Mahfud pair is also trying to attract Islamic voters to vote for them. Ganjar-Mahfud is trying to attract support from Islamic voters by utilizing their relationship with NU (NU) and the Islamic community in general. Mahfud, as an NU figure and a graduate of an Islamic boarding school, already has a strong support base among students and the Islamic community. Meanwhile, Ganjar is strengthening his network among NU through his family relationships, considering that his wife is the daughter of an NU cleric in Central Java. With this background, Ganjar and Mahfud are trying to unite the votes of Islamic voters, In the 2024 presidential election, Prabowo appears to have changed his approach compared to the 2019 presidential election. In the previous election, Prabowo was widely associated with Islamic identity politics, especially because he supported conservative Islamic groups and rhetoric that emphasized religious values. In the 2024 presidential

election, Prabowo appears to be trying to broaden his support base by distancing himself from overly prominent Islamic identity politics. Prabowo may want to shift the focus away from religious identity issues and place more emphasis on other issues such as economic development and political stability. This move could be a strategy to appeal to a wider range of voters, including those who may be uncomfortable with identity politics or who are more focused on non-religious issues. Despite trying to move away from religious identity politics, in the 2024 presidential election, Prabowo is still using Islamic figures and clerics to attract Muslim voters. This can be seen from Prabowo's statement when attending the national Istighotsah and joint prayer for the safety of the nation and state in Bahrul Ulum Islamic Boarding School in Tambakberas, Jombang, Sunday (21/5/2023) evening. "So wherever I say, I do not ask for support from the kiai, the ulama, the santri and so on. I do not ask for support. Please note and record it!" "But if.. wait. But if in my heart, I hope for support, right? Yes, ma'am?" In the 2019 presidential election, Prabowo Subianto (along with Sandiaga Uno) indeed carried Islamic identity politics that emphasized religious sentiment. This reflects their strategy to attract conservative Muslim voters. Prabowo also attended the 3rd Ulama Ijtima held at the Lor In Hotel, Bogor, West Java, on Wednesday (1/5/2019). In the 2024 presidential election, Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar are also considered to be carrying Islamic identity politics, with Anies known as a candidate close to Muhammadiyah and Muhaimin to NU. However, the election results show that their support among Muslim and non-Muslim voters is different compared to Prabowo Sandi in the 2019 presidential election. Although also carrying Islamic identity politics, Anies-Muhaimin received more varied support among Muslim voters, but not as strong as expected.The pair Anies Baswedan (center) and Muhaimin Iskandar became the 2024 Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates who attended the Ijtima Ulama at the Az Zikra Assembly Complex, Sentul, Bogor Regency, West Java, Saturday (11/18/2023). The Ijtima Ulama and National Figures event held by three parties, namely the Islamic Brotherhood Front, the 212 Alumni Brotherhood, and the National Fatwa Defenders Movement (GNPF) was attended by 600 participants representing all over Indonesia and took the theme Uniting the Direction of the Struggle of Muslims Towards a Better Renewal of Indonesia. Anies-Muhaimin also face challenges in attracting support from non-Muslim voters, the results may show different dynamics from Prabowo-Sandi, especially with their different political backgrounds. Of the 9 provinces with Muslim-majority voters won by Prabowo in the 2019 Presidential Election, Anies-Muhaimin only won in 2 provinces and lost badly in the rest. However, this did not happen in voters with a non-Muslim majority. These differences in results may reflect changes in voter preferences and responses to identity politics in Muslim voters and non-Muslim voters. It can be concluded that voters who are predominantly Muslim do not use references to Islamic identity politics in determining their choice of President in the 2024 Presidential Election. On the other hand, voters who are predominantly non-Muslim continue to use identity politics in determining their choice. This identity politics includes religious identity and ethnic identity.This

study offers a new perspective in understanding how voters from the majority (Muslim community) and minority (non-Muslim community) in Indonesia respond to the narrative of identity politics in the presidential election. This study introduces the idea that Muslim majority voters tend to support candidate pairs affiliated with Islamic identity politics, while minority voters tend to avoid candidate pairs that emphasize Islamic identity politics too much.This finding is important because it provides insight into voter behavior based on identity differences (especially religious and ethnic backgrounds) in the Indonesian political context. It highlights how differences in religious identity can influence political preferences, and how Islamic identity politics is used as a tool to attract votes among the majority. The study tries to find that political identity (Islam) is not static, but can change and adapt based on social interactions within the majority and minority groups. In the Indonesian context, Muslim majority voters may show flexibility or change in their political identity in voting compared to non-Muslim voters. This research can provide new insights into how groups with different identities influence and are influenced by each other in political and social contexts, and how these dynamics shape the way politics is done in Indonesia. Concerning the Development of Islamic Society, the novelty that can be obtained from this research is very relevant to understanding how Islamic society can develop inclusively and democratically in the context of identity politics. Research can identify effective strategies for empowering Muslim communities to understand politics. This includes how Muslim communities can develop approaches that acknowledge their diversity (such as differences in madzhab, ethnicity, or socio-economic background) and work together with non-Muslim groups to achieve common goals. These results can guide Islamic organizations in building a broader narrative that is not limited to religious identity alone.

V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Based on the research results and discussions outlined in the previous chapter, this study can conclude as follows.

1. Identity politics played different roles in the 2019 and 2024 presidential elections in Indonesia,
   a. Identity politics does not play a significant role in influencing the preferences of voters from the Muslim majority.
   b. Identity politics plays a significant role in influencing voter preferences from the non-Islamic majority (Catholic, Protestant Christian, Hindu, and other beliefs) in the 2019 and 2024 presidential elections in Indonesia.
   c. Identity politics played a significant role in influencing the election results in the 2019 and 2024 presidential elections in Indonesia, especially among voters from the Acehnese and Minang ethnic groups, who are predominantly Muslim.
2. Muslim voters and non-Muslim voters use their identity in determining their political choices.
3. Understanding Islamic politics can help Islamic voters in determining political choices.

4. Majority and minority (Muslim voters and non-Muslim voters) influence the discourse of identity politics in Indonesia.

SUGGESTION

1. Referring to the research of Prooijen and Krouwel (2019), which shows that psychological pressure, cognitive simplicity, overconfidence, and intolerance can trigger political extremism, it is important for Muslims to understand politics, especially identity politics, in-depth and continuously. In the context of da'wah, a wise and prudent approach to providing an understanding of Islamic politics and Islamic leadership must be carried out consistently, not only before the election but also at every opportunity throughout the government period.

2. Currently, no research specifically examines Islamic political support and voting behavior in Muslim majority and minority provinces in Indonesia in the context of Islamic Community Development. Therefore, further research is needed that focuses on the relationship between Islamic politics and the behavior of the Muslim community as a majority group to develop Islamic society as a whole. Research explores the factors that influence people's voting behavior in these areas. By identifying patterns of support and voting behavior, research can also contribute to efforts to strengthen the role of Islamic politics in the broader context of Indonesian democracy, ensuring that the aspirations of Muslim communities are met fairly and equally.

3. Political sentiments related to Tribe, Religion, Race, and Inter-Group (SARA) are often seen as sensitive issues and prone to triggering conflict. However, if managed well, this sentiment can be used as a means to improve akhlakul karimah or noble behavior in politics. In the context of Indonesian politics, religion and ethnicity can support each other to create a more polite and commendable political culture. By educating political elites, supporters, and sympathizers about the importance of maintaining polite and ethical behavior, avoiding money politics, and maintaining cleanliness and order, SARA sentiments can be used as a tool to build better political ethics, strengthen democracy, and promote social harmony.

4. In the 2019 Election and also the 2024 Election, the use of identity politics (especially involving religion, kyai, religious leaders, and Islamic boarding schools) remains a controversial subject among the public and academics. This is because there are differences of opinion regarding the relationship between Islam and politics. Some people and political observers consider that religion-based identity politics tends to be divisive, while others believe that religion should be an inseparable part of political and social life. It is important to instill an understanding that religion and politics cannot be separated and to make religion a source of inspiration in politics. This will ensure that religiosity has an important role in national development and is not merely a short-term political tool. Religion is expected to be the moral and ethical basis for political decision-making. The role of religious leaders is becoming increasingly important. They have a strategic position to influence people to continue to uphold political ethics and reject destructive practices, such as corruption

or money politics. With consistent preaching, they can direct society towards a more just and dignified politics.

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